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Creeping Judicialization In Special Education Hearings?: An 
Exploratory Study 
 
 
By Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, and Anastasia D’Angelo∗
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), is a 
funding act that provides an entitlement of a “free, appropriate, 
public education” (FAPE) for eligible students.1  The cornerstone for 
dispute resolution under the IDEA is an impartial due process 
hearing, with a second-tier administrative review in some states and 
with a right to judicial review in either state or federal court.2  
∗ Perry A. Zirkel, Ph.D., J.D., LL.M., is university professor of education and 
law at Lehigh University; Zorka Karanxha, Ed.D., is assistant professor at the 
University of South Florida; and Anastasia D’Angelo, Ed.D., is assistant principal 
in Pocono Mountain School District. The first author also is co-chair of the 
Pennsylvania hearing appeals panel under the IDEA, but his viewpoint herein, with 
one noted exception, is as a professor, not a review officer.  While retaining the 
responsibility for the contents of this article, the authors thank Dee Ann Wilson of 
the Iowa Department of Education for her generous cooperation and attorney 
Thomas Mayes of the Iowa Department of Education for his footnote suggestions.  
© 2006.  
 
1. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401 et seq. (2005).  The implementing regulations are at 34 
C.F.R. Part 300. Congress passed the original version, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act, in 1975.  It has been amended several times since then, 
including 1986, when attorneys’ fees were added; 1990, when the legislation was 
re-named the IDEA; 1997, when the revisions included special provisions for 
discipline; and, most recently, 2004, when the various refinements included 
additions to fit the No Child Left Behind Act.  See, e.g., MITCHELL YELL, THE LAW 
AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 70-76 (2d ed., 2006).  The most recent regulations were 
issued in 2006.  71 Fed. Reg. 46, 540 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
2. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)-(i) (2005); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510-300.516 (2006).  
Currently, approximately 17 states have a second, review-officer tier, with the 
remaining 33 states opting for a one-tier, state-level hearing officer system.  Eileen 
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Various commentators have decried the increased adversarial nature 
of due process hearings.3  In what may be at least partial recognition 
of the problem,4 the 2004 Amendments to the IDEA included fine-
tuning of this dispute resolution mechanism, such as adding more 
detailed notice-pleading5 and “resolution session”6 steps before the 
hearing.7  These provisions may contribute to,8 whether or not they 
recognize, the increasingly burdensome nature9 of the due process 
mechanism under the Act. 10  
                                                          
Ahearn, Due Process Hearings: 2001 Update, QTA: PROJECT FORUM 2 (April 
2002) (available from the National Association of State Directors of Special 
Education). 
3. See, e.g., Steven S. Goldberg: The Failure of Legalization in Education: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 441 (1989); Steven S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, 
Doing Away with Due Process, 42 EDUC. L. REP. (WEST) 491 (1988) 
(characterizing adversarial system of due process hearings as a failure and 
suggesting that mediation is not an effective alternative); Kevin Lanigan, et al., 
Nasty, Brutish … and Often Very Short: The Attorney Perspective on Due Process, 
in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 213 (Chester E. Finn et 
al., eds. 2001) (criticizing lack of efficacy of due process hearings); Donal M. 
Sacken, Reflections on an Adversarial Process: The Confessions of a Special 
Education Hearing Officer (1988) (unpublished paper, on file with the author) 
(recommending elimination or at least improvement of the hearing process in light 
of its adversarial nature). 
4. See, e.g., S. REP. NO 108-85, at 6 (2003): “The committee is discouraged to 
hear that many parents, teachers, and school officials find that some current IDEA 
provisions encourage an adversarial, rather than a cooperative, atmosphere, in 
regards to special education.” 
5. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1415(b)(7), 1415(c)(2). 
6. § 1415(f)(1)(B). The subsequent regulations further refined this new 
mechanism.  34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)-(c) (2006).   
7. The Amendments also bolstered the mediation mechanism (20 U.S.C.A. § 
1415(e)); added qualifications for hearing officers (§ 1415(f)(3)(A)); specified 
limitation periods for filing for the hearing and for judicial review (§§ 
1415(f)(3)(C), 1415(i)(2)(B)); and put limitations on the expansion of the hearing 
issues and the procedures-based decisions of hearing officers (§§ 1415(f))(3)(B), 
1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)).   
8. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
9. For commentary criticizing the “over-legalization” of the dispute-resolution 
procedures of the Act, see, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special 
Education, 195 EDUC. L. REP. 35 (2005) (proposing a streamlined model for due 
process hearings); Perry Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403 (1994) (elaborating on the 
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However, there has been negligible empirical research to 
determine whether due process hearings, for which the IDEA 
regulations prescribe a relatively expedited period for completion,11 
have been subject to “creeping judicialization,” here referring to a 
gradualistic increase of the time-consuming proceduralism associated 
                                                          
increased legalism and proposed streamlining of the hearing process); Perry Zirkel, 
Why Reauthorization May Provide Only the Illusion of a Solution, EDUC. WK., 
May 21, 2003, at 44; cf. Ann Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and 
the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (criticizing the “legalization of 
disability in schools” specifically with regard to the IDEA’s discipline protections); 
Donal Sacken, Mayson v. Teague: The Dilemma of Selecting Hearing Officers, 16 
J.L. & EDUC. 187 (1987) (arguing for dismantling the hearing officer system at the 
state level, authorizing the local board of education to be the hearing body).  
Although conceptually imprecise, “legalization” in this context refers primarily to 
“court-like procedures to enforce and protect rights.”  David Neal & David Kirp, 
The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education, 48 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65 (1985); cf. David Kirp & Donald Jensen, What Does 
Due Process Do? 73 PUB. INT. 75 (1983) (early characterization that due process 
hearings “degenerate into law-ridden affairs that often upset the participants”).  For 
broader meanings of “legalization” in other educational contexts, see David Kirp, 
Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 841 (1976); Mark Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of 
Authority and Organizational Theory: Implementing Due Process for Students in 
the Public Schools, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 891. 
10. Imbued with formal proceduralism, the courts have largely been limited to 
repeating the Supreme Court’s dictum that the administrative as well as judicial 
dispute resolution process under the IDEA is “ponderous.”  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 
305, 322 (1985); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 
370 (1985). 
11. Specifically, in comparison to the generally much more time-consuming 
period for judicial proceedings, the regulations specify a maximum of 45 calendar 
days from the date of receipt of the hearing request to the date of the decision 
except for specific extensions of time that the hearing officer grants upon request of 
either party.  34 C.F.R. §§ 300.515(a), 300.515(c) (2006).  For those states that 
have opted for a review-officer stage, the regulations provide for a 30-day period 
for such review, exclusive of extensions.  § 300.511(b).  As the comments 
accompanying the regulations make clear, these time limits are “long-standing.”  
64 Fed. Reg. 12,618 (Mar. 12, 1999) (Attachment I to IDEA regulations).  They 
date back to the original regulations in the late 1970.  See, e.g., STEVEN S. 
GOLDBERG, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 169 (1982).  In the legislative history of the 
original legislation, Senator Williams emphasized the importance of promptly 
providing eligible children with special education and related services, declaring: 
“It is expected that all hearings and reviews conducted pursuant to these provisions 
will be commenced and disposed of as quickly as practicable….”  121 CONG. REC. 
37, 416 (1975). 
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with the courts12 and often referred to more generally and less 
precisely as “legalization” or “over-legalization.”13  Illustrating the 
meaning of this concept, in the partially analogous context of labor 
arbitration14 Krahmal and Zirkel’s longitudinal analysis of the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services database revealed that 
grievance arbitration cases gradually increased from the early 1970s 
to the late 1990s in terms of available indicators of court-like 
formalization, such as the percentage of cases using transcripts and 
the average  elapsed time from filing to decision.15  
The literature to date includes at least limited empirical research 
concerning various aspects of IDEA due process hearings, such as 
                                                          
12. For the source of the term “judicialization,” see Lawrence M. Friedman, 
The Rise and Fall of Student Rights, in SCHOOL DAYS, SCHOOL RULES 238, 251 
(David Kirp & Donald Jensen eds. 1986).  For the “creeping” aspect, see Andriy 
Krahmal & Perry Zirkel, Creeping Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact or 
Fiction? 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 243 (2001). 
13. See supra note 9.  This Ninth Circuit observation shows the application to 
the IDEA: 
Working out an acceptable educational program must, in the end, 
be a cooperative effort between parents and school officials; the 
litigation process is simply too slow and too costly to deal 
adequately with the rapidly changing needs of children….  In 
addition, litigation tends to poison relationships, destroying 
channels for constructive dialogue that may have existed before 
the litigation began. This is particularly harmful here, since 
parents and school officials must—despite any bad feelings that 
develop between them—continue to work closely with one 
another. As this case demonstrates, when combat lines are firmly 
drawn, the child's interests often are damaged in the ensuing 
struggle. 
Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1400 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994). 
14. See, e.g., Spencer Salend & Perry Zirkel, Special Education Hearings:  
Prevailing Problems and Practical Proposals, 19 EDUC. & TRAINING MENTALLY 
RETARDED 29 (1984) (suggesting various expediting features of labor arbitration 
for IDEA due process hearings).  Showing the possible analogy, the House version 
of the 2004 amendments to the IDEA provided for voluntary binding arbitration, 
although the Conference Committee settled on the Senate version, which did not. 
H.R. REP. NO. 108-779, at 213 (2004). 
15. See Krahmal & Zirkel, supra note 12.  The other factor was the number of 
days charged, which is specific to this private form of dispute resolution as 
compared with due process hearings under the IDEA. 
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characteristics of hearing officers,16 state practices for hearings,17 
parties’ perceptions of fairness,18 costs of due process hearings,19 
outcomes (i.e., percentage of wins) in due process hearings,20 and 
factors related to outcomes.21   
                                                          
16. See, e.g., Ann P. Turnbull, Bonnie Strickland, & H. Rutherford Turnbull, 
Due Process Hearing Officers: Characteristics, Needs, and Appointment Criteria, 
48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 48 (1981) (finding that North Carolina hearing officers 
were almost evenly divided among attorneys, educators, and former educators); cf. 
Joy Markowitz, Eileen Ahearn & Judy Schrag, Dispute Resolution: A Review of 
Systems in Selected States 13-16 (June 2003) (available at www.nasdse.org) 
(reporting characteristics of hearing officer systems as limited part of study of 10 
diverse states). 
17. See, e.g., Antonis Katsiyannis & Kathe Klare, State Practices in Due 
Process Hearings: Considerations for Better Practice, 12 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL 
EDUC. 54 (1991) (state-by-state survey included the number of tiers, hearing 
officers, scheduled hearings, and hearing decisions as of 16 years ago); cf. Julie 
Underwood, NSBA Survey on Delegation (1999) (available at 
www.law.seattle.edu/aljho/resources/surveys) (survey as to whether state delegated 
its special education hearings to a non-education agency); James Thomeczek, 
Special Education Due Process under IDEA 2004 (2006) (paper presented an the 
annual meeting of the Education Law Association, on file with the author) 
(discussing number of hearing requests in 2004-05 and 2005-06). 
18. See, e.g., Milton Budoff & Alan Orenstein, Special Education Appeals 
Hearings: Are They Fair and Are They Helping?, 2 EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. Q. 37 
(1981) (finding disillusionment on both sides after the early Massachusetts 
hearings); Steven S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Evaluating the Fairness of Due 
Process Hearings, 57 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 546 (1991) (finding negative 
perceptions, particularly among parent participants, in Pennsylvania hearings 
during 1980-84); cf. Martha L. Morvant & Richard W. Zeller, Oregon Dispute 
Resolution Study: Trends, Uses and Satisfaction (August 1997) (Western Regional 
Resource Center, Eugene, OR) (finding both parents and districts to be evenly split 
between being satisfied and dissatisfied during 1989-96). 
19. See, e.g., Jay G. Chambers, Jenifer J. Harr & Amynah Dhanani, What Are 
We Spending on Procedural Safeguards in Special Education, 1999-2000? (May 
2003) (available from ERIC, access no. ED 480760) (estimating the cost of a due 
process hearing in 1999-2000 to be in the range of $8,160-$12,2000 not including 
personnel time); cf. David Yeager et al., A Study of Issues and Costs to Districts 
Relation to Special Education Complaints, Mediation, and Due Process Hearings 
in the State of Texas (2000) (available from ERIC, access no. ED 455604) ($17,000 
average cost for limited sample of 11 hearings in 1998-99). 
20. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: THE 
ATTORNEY FEE PROVISION OF PUBLIC LAW 99-371 (1989) (finding that parents 
“prevailed in all or part” in 43% of the hearings nationwide in 1984-88); Barbara 
Kammerlohr, Robert Henderson & Steven Rock, Special Education Due Process 
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The published research that is longitudinal and relatively recent is 
even more limited.  In a compilation of reports from the various 
states, the National Association of State Directors of Special 
Education (NASDSE) reported an increase in the total number of 
hearings held nationwide, from 1574 to 3020, during the period from 
1991 to 2000, with a high point in 1996 of 3,555 and a gradual 
decrease since then.22  For the entire period, the leading six 
                                                          
Hearings in Illinois, 49 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 417 (1983) (finding that parents won 
20% of the early hearings in Illinois); Peter Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due 
Process?: Affecting the Outcome of Special Education Hearings in Pennsylvania, 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1985) (finding that parents won in whole or part 36% 
of the first four years of hearings in Pennsylvania); Thomas Smith, Status of Due 
Process Hearings, 48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 232 (1981) (finding that parents won 
37% of the early hearings nationwide); Perry Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special 
Education Case Law: An Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731, 740 
(2002) (finding that parents won 29% of the published hearing/review officer 
decisions nationally for 1989-2000 and that 21% of the outcomes were mixed).  
The categorization of wins and losses is subject to complexity more than 
consensus.  See, e.g., Milton Budoff, Alan Orenstein & John Abramson, Due 
Process Hearings: Appeals for Appropriate Public School Programs, 48 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 180, 181 (1981); Thomas Mayes & Perry Zirkel, Special 
Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL & 
SPECIAL EDUC. 350, 354 (2001). 
21. See, e.g., Martin Diebold & Robert Simpson, An Investigation of the Effect 
of Due Process Hearing Officer Occupation on Placement Decisions, 11 
DIAGNOSTIQUE 69 (1986) (finding nonsignificant relationship between hearing 
officer occupational status and placement decisions in response to vignettes); 
Geoffrey Schultz & Joseph McKinney, Special Education Due Process Hearings, 
2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17 (finding gender and attorney v. non-attorney 
occupation of hearing officer significantly related to settlement of cases in one 
Midwestern state during 1992-96); James Newcomer, Perry Zirkel & Ralph Tarola, 
Characteristics of Special Education Hearing and Review Officer Cases, 123 
EDUC. L. REP. 449 (1998) (finding three of ten case characteristics, including 
background of the hearing officer, to be significantly related to the outcome of 
hearing officer cases in Pennsylvania during 1973-89); James Newcomer & Perry 
Zirkel,  An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469 (1999) (finding moderate relationship between 
hearing/review outcome and court outcome).  For an initial and inconclusive 
exploration of the relationship to SES, see Michael Kirst & Kay Bertken, Due 
Process Hearings in Special Education: Some Early Findings from California, in 
SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES: THEIR HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION, AND FINANCE 
(Jay Chambers & William Hartman eds., 1983). 
22. Eileen Ahearn, Due Process Hearings: 2001 Update, QTA FORUM 6 (April 
2002) (available at www.nasdse.org).  The GAO report, supra note 20, only 
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jurisdictions in order, were New York, the District of Columbia, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, and Maryland; together they 
accounted for nearly eighty percent of all of the hearings held.23  In a 
study limited to published hearing officer decisions, which is 
different in more than one respect from “hearings held,”24 Zirkel & 
D’Angelo analyzed the number of cases for three-year periods from 
1977-79 and 1998-2000, finding a low frequency in the initial period, 
then a higher, relative plateau during 1980-91, and successive 
increases during the last decade.25  Again, relatively few states 
accounted for the majority of the cases.26
In general, the data management of the various states for due 
process hearings is notably wanting both in terms of completeness 
                                                          
covered the decreasing sub-period of 1996-2000.  U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE: SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND 
STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 
(September 2003).  A recently completed follow-up survey that did not include the 
District of Columbia (primarily due to its singular lack of response) revealed that 
the period from 1997 to 2005 represented an uneven plateau and that the ranking of 
the states varied somewhat when their totals were adjusted in relation to special 
education enrollments.  Perry Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings 
under the IDEA: A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis (2007) (journal article under 
review, on file with the author). 
23. See GAO Report, supra note 20, at 13-14.  The data are imprecise due to 
various factors, including differing definitions of “hearings held” and “years”.  
Eileen Ahearn, Due Process Hearings: 1999 Update, QTA FORUM 2 (December 
1999) (available at www.nasdse.org).  Moreover, the analysis does not include 
IDEA hearings conducted by the Department of Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals and those in U.S. territories and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
24. See, e.g., Anastasia D’Angelo, J. Gary Lutz & Perry Zirkel, Are Published 
IDEA Hearing Officer Decisions Representative? 14 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 
241 (2004). The differences include that the published cases were full, written 
decisions that were submitted and selected for publication in the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR).   
25. Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra note 20, at 740.  For the period from 1977-79, 
the number was 126; for the intermediate period, the number averaged 271, and the 
final three-year periods the successive subtotals were 337, 577, and 693.  Id. 
26. The top five states, together accounting for 55.2% of the published 
decisions, were, in order: New York, California, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas.  Id. at 744.  However, when the frequencies were adjusted in proportion to 
special education enrollments, the leading five states were Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Delaware, and New Hampshire.  Id. at 744 n.47. 
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and uniformity.27  The only state that had and was willing to share a 
complete set of the due process decisions—other than those states 
that previously had only a de minimis number of decisions—was 
Iowa.28  Nevertheless, Iowa has had relatively few decisions,29 and it 
is known for a relatively proactive general and special education 
system.30  In a previous analysis, Rickey & Wilson reported that 
Iowa had fifty adjudicated hearings from 1989-90 to 2000-01, 
representing rather steady successively lower levels averaging five 
and three per year for the first and second halves, respectively, of this 
period.31  They attributed the reduction to Iowa’s successive 
provisions for various resolution provisions, including a pilot project 
for pre-appeal conferences in 1987 and the institutionalized (via state 
                                                          
27. See, e.g., Markowitz at al., supra note 16; Howard Schrag & Judy Schrag, 
National Dispute Resolution Use and Effectiveness Study (Summer 2004) 
(available at www.directionservice.org). 
28. We contacted via email and/or telephone the responsible staff member in 
each state.  Those with de minimis numbers, based on less than 1% (n=30) of the 
decisions for the period 1991-2000, were Alaska (est. 15 decisions), Idaho (24), 
Montana (20), New Mexico (22), North Dakota (16), Utah (14), and Wyoming 
(20).  Ahearn, supra note 22, at 6. 
29. For example, for the period 1991-2000, Iowa had 42 decisions, placing it 
39th of 50 states in total number of hearings held during 1991-2000.  Id.  Its rank 
when the total number of hearings is adjusted for the size of special education 
enrollments in each state was 48th.  See Zirkel & Gischlar, supra note 22.   
30. See, e.g., IOWA DEP'T OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUCATION ELIGIBILITY 
STANDARDS (2006) (providing Iowa’s generic RTI model for special education 
eligibility); see also Martin J. Ikeda et al., Agency-Wide Implementation of 
Problem-Solving Consultation, 11 SCH. PSYCH. Q. 228 (1996) (describing 
Heartland Area Education Agency’s multilevel problem-solving method for 
prereferral intervention as a result of Iowa’s successive statewide initiatives); 
Elizabeth A. Jankowski, Heartland Area Education Agency’s Problem Solving 
Model, 22 RURAL SPECIAL EDUC. Q. 29 (2003) (providing updated information on 
Heartland’s model based on state-wide encouragement of alternative assessment 
and delivery systems); W. David Tilly, Diagnosing the Learning Enabled: The 
Promise of Response to Intervention, 32 PERSPECTIVES 20 (Winter 2006) (referring 
to “many benefits Iowans have experienced throughout the past 15 years of 
evolving towards [a response to intervention model]”); see also infra note 32. 
31. Kristen Rickey & Dee Ann Wilson, A Report on Special Education Due 
Process Hearings in Iowa 8 (September 2003) (available at 
http://www.iowa.gov/educate/content/view/607/587/1/3). The cadre of hearing 
officers is relatively small and stable, serving part-time in this role and largely 
being university professors with special education expertise.  Id. at 12-13, 39.  At 
least one of the professors, Larry Bartlett, has a law degree. 
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regulations) pre-appeal conference process in 1995.32  Their other 
findings included a 35% success rate for parents on an issue-by-issue 
basis and considerable variance in the number of issues per hearing, 
the number of sessions per hearing, and the percentage of parties 
represented by attorneys; but they did not analyze these variables 
longitudinally.33
 
II.  METHOD 
 
The Iowa Department of Education provided a full set of the 145 
written hearing officer decisions from the implementation of the 
IDEA to the end of 2005.34  With supervision and consultation from 
the first author, the other two authors developed and refined a coding 
system until they reached a 95% level of interrater reliability on an 
initial random sample of cases.  Each of these two authors then coded 
half of the cases.  The variables and coding categories, along with 
clarifying notes, are as follows: 
Descriptive variable:35
• Outcomes: parents won, mixed, and district won36 
 
                                                          
32. Id. at 40.  The state’s innovative efforts in terms of providing to the 
intermediate units—called “area education agencies” (AEAs)—mediation training 
in 1995 and resolution facilitator process in 2000 were also notable.  Id.  The “pre-
appeal conference” process provided the opportunity to access the state-trained 
mediators prior to filing for a hearing, an innovation not incorporated into the 
IDEA until the 2004 amendments.  E-mail from Professor Larry Bartlett, Iowa 
hearing officer and attorney (Jan. 7, 2006) (on file with author). 
33. See Rickey supra note 31, at 10-11, 14-15.  Other variables that they 
analyzed included student characteristics and appeals to state or federal court.  Id. 
at 19-22, 33-38.  For a published analysis that is limited to some of these non-
longitudinal findings, see Kristen Rickey, Special Education Due Process 
Hearings, 14 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 46 (2003). 
34. The date of the first decision in the set was 30 May1978, and that of the 
last decision was 26 September 2005.  One decision was the dismissal on the 
grounds of subject matter jurisdiction; even though there was no hearing, there was 
a full opinion. 
35. The outcome variable, along with the total number of cases, are merely 
descriptive dimensions for the population of hearing officer decisions overall. 
36. Inasmuch as this variable was merely descriptive rather than an indicator of 
judicialization and inasmuch as the percentage of cases in the mixed category was 
limited, we did not tabulate outcomes on an issue-by-issue basis. 
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Judicialization variables:37
• Attorney representation38: both sides, parent side only, 
defendant side only, and neither side39 
• Duration A: number of calendar days from date of filing 
to date of decision40 
• Duration B: number of sessions of the hearing41 
• Complexity: number of issues that the hearing officer 
decided42 
• Legalism A: number of legal citations that the hearing 
officer included43 
                                                          
37. These variables, like those used in Krahmal & Zirkel, supra note 12, are 
merely indicia that, as partial or proxy measures, provide evidence of 
judicialization as defined by this study on a cumulative basis.  No one of them is an 
entirely independent or complete measure.   
38. This variable served as a transition, being used both descriptively (overall) 
and as an indicator of judicialization (longitudinally). 
39. Under Iowa law, the AEA must participate in the hearing along with the 
local school district.  Inasmuch as this feature is not generalizable to other states 
and inasmuch as there were no differences in attorney representation between the 
AEAs and local districts, we conflated these two entities into the defendant side for 
this variable. 
40. Where the decision did not report the specific filing date, we estimated it 
where the decision provided sufficient other information, such as the date of the 
last recorded event with either the local school district or the AEA.  In 
approximately 12% of the cases we did not have sufficient information to 
extrapolate a reasonable estimate.  Moreover, we used the date of the decision for 
categorizing the case as to year.  Given the negligible number of cases in which the 
hearing officer’s decision indicated an officially granted postponement, we counted 
the entire period from filing to decision. 
41. Although correlated moderately with duration, the number of separate 
hearing sessions served as a separable indicator of judicialization.  For example, 
some cases had multiple sessions but back-to-back or closely proximate, whereas 
others had fewer sessions but spread widely apart. 
42. For consistency, we used the date of decision for categorizing the case as 
to year.  We counted the number of separable issues that the hearing officer 
decided; if either or both parties raised an issue but the hearing officer did not 
address it, we did not include it. 
43. We counted each specific citation of primary legal sources, such as a 
statutory subsection, court decision, or hearing officer decision that appeared in the 
legal conclusions section of the hearing officer’s opinion except for repetitions.  
Attempts at weighting the citations in terms of degree of reliance or significance 
were unsuccessful in terms of interrater reliability.   
    
Spring 2007         Creeping Judicialization In Special Education Hearings? 37 
• Legalism B: variety of legal source categories that the 
hearing officer cited44 
• Length: number of pages of the hearing officer’s 
decision45 
 
III.  RESULTS 
 
The outcomes of the 145 hearing officer decisions were: parents 
won = 32%; mixed = 8%; and defendant won = 60%.  As for attorney 
representation on an overall basis, parent side had an attorney in 82% 
of the cases and the defendant side had an attorney in 90% of the 
cases.  More specifically, the distribution was: both sides represented 
= 67%; parent only =15%; defendant only = 13%; and neither side = 
5%. 
Figure 1 re-examines the variable of attorney representation 
longitudinally.  The coding for each case, which formed the vertical 
axis for this bar graph, was: “0” = neither party had attorney 
representation; “1.0” = one party or the other had attorney 
representation; and “2.0” = both parties had attorney representation.  
Each bar in the graph represents the average on this 0-to-2 scale for 
the year. 
 
                                                          
44. We used the following categories of legal sources: 1) legislation and 
regulations; 2) court decisions; 3) hearing and review officer decisions; 4) 
published policy interpretations (e.g., the commentary accompanying the IDEA 
regulations and U.S. Office of Special Education Programs policy letters); and 5) 
miscellaneous other (e.g., IDEA legislative history and state attorney general 
opinions).  
45. Again, although overlapping with the number of issues, the length of the 
decision served as another one of multiple indicia of judicialization. 
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Figure 1. Attorney Representation 
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An examination of Figure 1 reveals a very gradual overall trend, 
with notable fluctuations, in the direction of complete attorney 
representation.  More specifically, in the first few years, on average 
one side or the other had attorney representation,46 whereas in recent 
years both parties had an attorney in the majority of the cases.47  
The first duration variable, the number of days from filing to 
decision on an annual average basis, is presented in Figure 2. 
 
                                                          
46. During 1978-83, 70% of parents had attorney representation, whereas 89% 
of the LEAs (and 54% of the AEAs) had such representation.  Where parents did 
not have attorney representation, they typically had lay advocates. 
47. During 2000-05, 96% of LEAs and 95% of AEAs had attorney 
representation, while the parents’ level remained at 70%. 
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Figure 2. Average Number of Days from Filing to Decision 
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Figure 2 reveals considerable variance but an overall rather acute 
trend toward shorter rather than longer duration.  More specifically, 
in the initial six-year period in the wake of the initial IDEA 
regulations (i.e., 1978-83), the average duration was 169 days, 
whereas the most recent six-year period (i.e., 2000-05) averaged 52 
days, which is much closer to but still above the 45-day period 
prescribed in the regulations.48
The second duration variable, the number of sessions per case, is 
presented in Figure 3.  Again, each bar in the graph represents the 
average for that year. 
 
                                                          
48. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2006). 
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Figure 3. Average Number of Sessions per Case 
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Although again not without fluctuation, Figure 3 shows an overall 
notable slope toward more sessions per case.  More specifically, the 
trend has shifted from a norm of one session per case to an average of 
two sessions per case. 
Figure 4 portrays the complexity variable, the annual average for 
the number of issues decided per case. 
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Figure 4. Average Number of Issues Decided per Case 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Year
M
ea
n 
N
um
be
r o
f I
ss
ue
s 
D
ec
id
ed
 
As Figure 4 reveals, the trend line clearly is in the direction of a 
higher number of issues decided in each case when averaged on a 
yearly basis.  More specifically, the norm has shifted from 1-2 issues 
per case in the early years to an average of 3 issues per case in recent 
years.    
The first legalism variable, which is the number of specific 
citations per case on an average annual basis, is arrayed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Average Number of Legal Citations Per Case 
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A review of Figure 5 reveals notable variation but a rather steep 
upward trend in terms of number of specific citations in the legal 
conclusions section of the hearing officer decisions. More 
specifically, in the initial six-year period (i.e., 1978-83), the average 
number of citations per case was approximately 4 legal citations per 
case, whereas the most recent six-year period (i.e., 2000-05) 
averaged approximately 20 legal citations per case. 
The companion legalism variable, which is the variety of legal 
sources49 on an average annual basis, is pictured in Figure 6. 
 
                                                          
49. See supra note 44. 
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Figure 6. Average Variety of Legal Source Categories Cited 
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For the limited number of categories, Figure 6 shows a 
fluctuating but at least moderately steep ascending overall pattern in 
the variety of legal source categories cited in the hearing officer 
decisions.   More specifically, in the initial six-year period (i.e., 1978-
83), the average number of legal source categories per case was 
approximately one category per case, whereas the most recent six-
year period (i.e., 2000-05) averaged three categories per case. 
Finally, Figure 7 charts the average length of the hearing officer 
decisions per year. 
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Figure 7. Average Length of Written Opinions 
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The trend line in Figure 7 reveals a pronounced upward direction 
in the length of hearing officer decisions, moving from an average of 
approximately 6 pages in the early years to approximately 19 pages 
in recent years. 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, the findings of this exploratory study, limited to the 
single state of Iowa, were that six of the seven indicia were in the 
direction of increased judicialization, with the trend for the 6 
generally fitting a  broad “creeping” characterization,50 ranging from 
slightly (attorney representation) to more steeply (citations and 
pages) upward trend lines with moderating variance.  The one clear 
exception was the first duration variable, representing the length of 
time from filing to hearing.  This exception may be attributable to 
                                                          
50. See supra notes 12, 25 and accompanying text.  The range of some of the 
indicia, such as attorney representation, was relatively limited, thus having a 
potentially moderating effect on the slope of the trend line.  Nevertheless, the 
notable variation contributes to this gradualistic characterization. 
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various possible explanations, including: 1) systematic efforts to 
reach the 45-day period prescribed in the IDEA regulations;51 2) 
imprecision in measuring this variable due to insufficient 
information, including possible extensions granted but not mentioned 
in the decision;52 and/or 3) the manageable magnitude and largely 
non-attorney membership of the hearing officer system in Iowa.53  
Yet, the results for the other duration variable—number of sessions 
per case—mitigated the reverse direction of the first.54  
Moreover, the cumulative upward trend line for the other 
variables, with some stretching the meaning of “creeping” despite 
notable fluctuation,55 confirmed the judicialization characterization.  
The upward trend for some of these indicia, particularly the total 
number and the source categories of the legal citations, are partially 
attributable to the evolution of this specialized field, which has been 
subject to substantial intervening legislative amendments,56 
consequently revised regulations, and rather abundant case law.57  
Yet, this explanation is incomplete, especially in light of the relative 
                                                          
51. A U.S. Office of Special Education Program review in 1990 contributed to 
this trend, but otherwise the state education department informally reinforced the 
need for timeliness as part of its regular monitoring process.  E-mail from Dee Ann 
Wilson (Dec. 20, 2006)(on file with author). 
52. See supra note 40. 
53. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  In contrast, the overall national 
trend is toward full-time attorney administrative law judges, which both is a result 
and cause of increasing judicialization.  See, e.g., Julie Underwood, NSBA Survey 
on Delegation (1999) (available at www.law.seattle.edu/aljho/resources).   
54. The correlation between these two variables was more limited than might 
be expected.  See supra note 41.  Even within a more limited time period, more 
sessions means the allocation of more resources and at least the potential for 
intensified adversariness.  
55. The notable fluctuation is likely attributable in part to the relatively small 
number of cases, both totally and annually, in Iowa in comparison to the litigious 
cluster of states.   Although having more than a de minimis level of decisions, Iowa 
is within the distinctly lower cluster of states, being 42nd on a total basis and 48th 
on a per capita basis.  See supra note 29. 
56. See supra note 1. 
57. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An 
Update, 114 EDUC. L. REP. 341 (1996) (finding a steep increase in the number of 
court decisions in special education during recent decades while the number of 
court decisions in regular education was in gradual decline). 
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non-litigious milieu and proactive posture of the state of Iowa.58  
There is every reason to suspect that the problems of increased 
judicialization, starting with the hearing-length variable, are much 
more pronounced in the litigious states that account for most of the 
IDEA hearings.59 
Pending study in such states, these initial results suggest that both 
policy makers and practitioners, especially the impartial hearing 
officers in each state, should carefully  consider the trade-offs of this 
increasing judicialization.60  Unlike labor arbitration, 61 for which the 
collective bargaining agreement is the controlling framework,62 
special education hearings have a detailed legal framework, starting 
                                                          
58. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
59. In the absence of corresponding systematic study in such states, anecdotal 
evidence abounds.  For example, an experienced New York parent attorney 
reported that in her state, which is second only to the District of Columbia in the 
number of due process hearings held, compliance with the 45-day maximum 
prescribed in the IDEA regulations “almost never occurs.”  Mary Lunch, Who 
Should Hear the Voices of Children with Disabilities: Proposed Changes in Due 
Process in New York’s Special Education System, 55 ALB. L. REV. 179, 184 
(1991).  
60. “Judicialization” as an initial matter is salutary as a matter of due process 
in dispute resolution.  The problem is when it reaches and extends beyond what 
may variously be determined as the tipping point, such that the costs outweigh the 
benefits.  The old saying “Justice delayed is justice denied” exemplifies, albeit 
simplistically, this concept.  Although some suggest that increased judicialization 
leads to increased consistency, this generalization would not appear to apply under 
the IDEA due to: 1) the emphasis of each individual child with a disability; 2) the 
fuzzy and subjective nature of the underlying field of special education; and 3) the 
variety among as well within states as to the qualifications and orientations of 
hearing officers. As an ancillary matter, the relationship of this trend to the 
outcome of the case in terms of which side prevailed is unclear.  For example, in an 
early study in Pennsylvania, when legalization was at its first stage, Kuriloff, supra 
note 20, found mixed results as to whether such indicia appeared to affect the 
outcome of the hearing.  For example, the number of parents’ witnesses was a 
significant factor, but their use of a lawyer was not.  On the district side, neither the 
number of witnesses nor the use of a lawyer was a significant factor. 
61. See Krahmal & Zirkel, supra note 12. 
62. Although said agreement is ultimately based on collective bargaining 
legislation, which in several states extends to public schools, and court decisions 
provide the rest of the legal framework, labor arbitrators’ use of statutes, court 
decisions, and other sources of “external” law has been notably limited and subject 
to longstanding controversy.  See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The Use of External Law in 
Labor Arbitration: An Analysis of Arbitral Awards, 1 DET. C. L. REV. 31 (1985). 
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with the IDEA legislation and, as a result of an express right of 
judicial review,63 including extensive case law.64  Although legal 
maturation of a field will mean more well-developed judicialization, 
at least in terms of the indicia in this study based on legal citations, at 
some point maturation becomes senescence.  Moreover, the IDEA is 
peculiarly individualized in its orientation, thus running counter to 
the generalizing goal of stare decisis, and a primary aim of IDEA due 
process hearings, like grievance arbitration, is expedited dispute 
resolution.65  The need for economy in terms of limiting the 
transaction costs of IDEA hearings66 should be equally obvious.67
Thus, it is arguably the case that the incremental, albeit 
gradualistic, increase in legalism associated with such hearings 
beyond the original expedited intent68 ultimately tends to benefit the 
legal establishment rather than the student with a disability, who 
                                                          
63. Moreover, unlike labor arbitration, judicial review under the IDEA is not 
particularly deferential.  See, e.g., James Newcomer & Perry Zirkel, An Analysis of 
Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 469 
(1999). 
64. See Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra note 20, at 740 (finding rather steady and 
steep upward trend in the number of published hearing officer and court decisions 
from 1977-79 through 1998-2000).  For an overview of the Supreme Court 
decisions under the IDEA, see Perry Zirkel, A Primer of Special Education Law, 38 
TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, 62 (2005). 
65. See supra note 11.   The courts’ rather broad tendency to take additional 
evidence under the IDEA undercuts the alternate purpose of providing a record for 
judicial review.  See, e.g., Andriy Krahmal, Perry Zirkel & Emily Kirk, “Additional 
Evidence” under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for 
Rigor, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 201 (2004).   
66. As a quick example of such costs, the stenographic expense for 
Pennsylvania hearings in fiscal year 2005-06 was $629,374.  PENNSYLVANIA 
OFFICE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ANNUAL REPORT JULY 1, 2005-JUNE 30, 2006 
Exh. 22, at 23 (2006).  Obviously, the number and length of hearing sessions 
correlate with this cost, and the stenographer is less expensive than various other 
personnel, such as the attorneys and expert witnesses. 
67. For example, the average per pupil cost of special education is 
approximately twice that of regular education, and the IDEA provides less than one 
fifth of that costly difference.  See Jay G. Chambers, Jenifer J. Harr & Amynah 
Dhanani, What Are We Spending on Special Education Services in the United 
States, 1999-2000? (June 2004) (available at http://CSEF-
air.org/publications/seepnational/AdvRpt1.pdf). 
68. See supra note 11. 
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needs prompt services,69 or the school system, which has limited 
resources for its educational mission.70  
 Although perhaps recognizing the problem,71 the Congressional 
prescription in the latest amendments to the IDEA,72 particularly the 
strengthened notice-pleading feature and extended timeline for the 
hearing decision, clearly borrow from, and potentially add to, the 
judicialization trend.   Time will tell whether the new pre-hearing 
procedures reduce the frequency and complexity of cases that go to 
hearing,73 but the likely trade-off will be not only more technical 
threshold issues, such as whether the complaint was sufficiently 
specific,74 but also closer and more complex cases, thus meaning 
longer duration to decision.  Of all these initial indicia of 
judicialization, the duration variable would appear to be the one that 
is potentially most amenable to correction75 and potentially most 
deleterious to the parties, including but not limited to the child.76  
                                                          
69. See supra note 11..   Echoing Senator Williams’ concern 16 years later, a 
clinical professor of law who represents parents of special education children, 
spoke from her own extensive experience: “I cannot emphasize enough that delay 
in resolving matters regarding the education program of a handicapped child is 
extremely detrimental to his development.”  Lunch, supra note 59, at 187. 
70. See supra note 67. 
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
73. An initial survey suggested a possible positive impact, but the authors 
acknowledged the possibility of other contributing factors, and their survey had 
notable limitations, including: 1) only tabulating hearing requests; 2) lack of 
responses from a fifth of the states, such as California, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania; and 3) comparing data for the calendar years 2004 and 2005 rather 
than before and after the July 1, 2005 effective date of the new provisions.  See 
Thomeczek, supra note 17.  Moreover, even if the new provisions succeed in 
reducing the number of hearings, it may be a weeding out process that results in 
more complex and contentious cases going to hearing and thereby being more 
likely to go on to judicial appeal. 
74. See, e.g., M.S.-G. v. Lenape Re’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR 
¶ 72 (D.N.J. 2007) (upholding hearing officer’s dismissal of the case for failure to 
satisfy IDEA’s pleading requirements). 
75. This suggestion raises the sensitive but significant issue of the selection 
and training of IDEA hearing officers, which varies from state to state but, in terms 
of specified competency areas, is the subject of a new IDEA provision.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f)(3)(A)). 
76. For the first author’s most recent reminders in continuing criticism of 
dilatory hearing officer decisions, see, e.g., Centennial Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 55 
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Adversariness often not only contributes to but also results from 
extended hearings.  Indeed, although it is indisputable that Congress 
intended the opposite,77 it has already been asserted that the new 
provisions may increase rather than decrease “the adversarial nature 
of special education dispute resolution.”78  Yet, perhaps the most 
salutary finding in this exploratory study is that despite an upward 
trend for the other indicia of legalization, hearing officers were able 
to achieve a significant downward trajectory in the duration from 
filing to decision, coming close to the “tipping” point established by 
the IDEA regulations of forty-five days.79  
Finally, it is rather ironic that the current special education case 
before the Supreme Court concerns whether parents have the right to 
proceed pro se in federal court cases under the IDEA.80  Reaching the 
High Court, the case exemplifies the current trend toward legalistic 
dispute resolution under the IDEA, and yet at the same time the 
plaintiff-parents seek to obviate a primary indicator of judicialization, 
attorney representation.  
In any event, the judicialization of special education, including 
but not limited to the effect of the new IDEA dispute resolution 
provision, merits more longitudinal analyses.81  Based on this 
                                                          
(Pa. SEA 2006); Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 149 (Pa. SEA 2006); 
Lancaster Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR § 266 (Pa. SEA 2006). 
77. See, e.g., Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special 
Education Disputes: Any Good IDEAs? 5 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. L.J. 137, 149 
(2005) (citing Sen. Report 108-85 (Nov. 3, 2003)). 
78. Id. at 150. 
79. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
80. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (cert. granted). 
81. One of the contributing factors to legalization in special education has been 
the continuing revisions in the IDEA legislation and regulations.  See, e.g., Dixie 
Huefner, The Legalization and Federalization of Special Education, in EDUCATING 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 355 (John Wills et al. eds., 1997) (attributing 
increased adversariness to the addition of the attorneys fee provision in the 1986 
amendments to the IDEA).  Another is the movement of the Supreme Court cases 
from central substantive issues, such as the meaning of “free appropriate 
education” and “related services,” to increasingly technical, litigation issues, such 
as burden of proof and pro se suits.  Compare Perry Zirkel, A Primer of Special 
Education Law, 38 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 62 (2005) (summary of 
major precedents starting with Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) 
and Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984)), with 
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 150 Fed. Appx. 406 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. 
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relatively fruitful but nevertheless limited exploratory study, we also 
recommend follow-up analyses in more litigious states, such as those 
that account for the bulk of the IDEA due process hearings,82 using 
more extensive quantitative indicia83 of judicialization as well as 
more in-depth studies of its causes and consequences84 not only 
within85 but also across86 states and other IDEA jurisdictions.87
                                                          
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 
126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006); and Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).  Other 
contributors include the judicializing trend of IDEA hearing officers (supra note 
53); the undeniably limited school district resources for the costs of special 
education (supra note 67) and the understandably high emotions of parents; the 
individualized nature of the IDEA, which limits the settling scope of the stare 
decisis doctrine; the “soft” state of the art/science of special education; and the 
particular “hyper lexis” condition of the United States. 
82. See supra notes 22-23.  
83. See supra note 37.   
84. Such studies, at least in part, should be qualitative, thus exploring indicia 
and related factors that are not subject to the limitations of quantitative analysis.  
For example, some observers hypothesize that high cost issues, such as tuition 
reimbursement, have become the dominant source of IDEA hearings, contributing 
to the increasing judicialization, but the first author’s experience as an IDEA 
review officer for more than 15 years suggests that issues that are high stakes in 
other ways, such as manifestation determination reviews in the wake of proposed 
expulsion, continue to be a source of hearings and that psychodynamics within 
families and, more often, between families and schools are the invisible driving 
force rather than the surface issues.   Case studies and other qualitative approaches 
are the way to explore such factors and their interactions.    
85. One example is the percentage of hearings that were appealed at the 
subsequent successive levels, which in two-tier states include a review officer and 
which in any event extend to the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts 
for review.  Additionally, access to full case records and/or party representatives, 
per the model of Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 18, would allow for fuller 
measures of the number of issues and additional indicia, such as number of 
transcript pages, exhibits, and legal objections.  Additionally, accurately assessing 
the significance of legal sources and the complexity of legal issues will further 
contribute to testing the judicialization hypothesis.  As an example of the 
complexity factor, consider this observation from one of the Iowa hearing officers: 
The issues … seem much more complex than those two decades 
ago.  I am in the third year of my only current assigned hearing.  
The primary issue was whether the State Education Department 
had jurisdiction over the expulsion of a 16 year-old from a group 
home (Medicaid) because he had various education-like 
components in his Medicaid Plan.  We took a long continuance 
when a federal district court upheld my ruling (against the 
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parents).  There were 13 attorneys up to that point.  The only 
remaining issue is the legality of the interagency agreements 
between the Departments of Education and Human Services.  
Bartlett, supra note 32.  For the federal district court’s decision that he referenced, 
see Baker v. G & G Living Centers, Inc., 45 IDELR ¶ 185 (N.D. Iowa 2006). 
86. An example of inter-state comparison would be the use of discovery 
procedures, which depends on what state law allows when specifically clear and 
what the parties do when the state law is silent or ambiguous.  The limited pertinent 
legal authority suggests that this matter is within the hearing officer’s authority 
unless contradicted by state law.  See, e.g., S.T. v. Sch. Bd., 783 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996). 
87. See supra note 32. 
